

Texts of Vance and Brown Remarks on Arms Pact

WASHINGTON, May 9 (UPI) — Following are the texts of statements today at the White House by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announcing general agreement with the Soviet Union on a new treaty to limit strategic arms:

By Mr. Vance

Ambassador Dobrynin and I have concluded our negotiations on SALT. Both Governments have now instructed their respective delegations at Geneva to incorporate into the joint draft treaty text the agreements reached in negotiations between Ambassador Dobrynin and myself and to complete negotiations on the few remaining secondary items which have not yet been resolved.

The time and place of a summit meeting are currently under discussion.

Let me make a few comments about the significance of these negotiations.

With this treaty, we will take an essential step toward a safer America and a safer world.

Our overriding purpose in these negotiations has been to strengthen our nation's security and that of our allies through practical and verifiable restraints on the nuclear arms race. Today, we are on the threshold of signing a strategic arms agreement that achieves our purpose.

Advantages of the Treaty

The treaty will enhance the security of the United States and our allies. It will restrain the nuclear arms race. It will lessen the likelihood of nuclear war.

The treaty will serve these essential interests of the American people in several concrete ways:

It will establish equal ceilings on the strategic forces of the Soviet Union and the United States.

It will begin the process of actually reducing the level of nuclear weapons systems, and it will begin to limit not only the quantitative but also the qualitative race in nuclear arms.

As a result, this treaty will limit the strategic challenges we would otherwise have to meet. It will hold down the expense we would have to bear to meet those challenges. And it will avoid much of the uncertainty about Soviet arms that would otherwise prevail.

This treaty will not only mark the end of one negotiation; it will open the way for another. When it is ratified by the Senate, it will become the cornerstone for still further limits and reductions in SALT III.

The national debate which we now commence is not only about this treaty.

We will be considering as well the inescapable realities of a nuclear world — the necessity to our security of a strong defense and the grave danger to our security of an unlimited race in nuclear arms.

For our security today lies in maintaining a stable strategic balance between two nations with awesome power. The SALT II treaty will make a substantial contribution to that stability.

We have demonstrated through the SALT process that even as we compete in some areas, the United States and the Soviet Union can and must cooperate to lessen the dangers of war. In this way, the treaty can serve to open the path to a more constructive and peaceful relationship between us.

This treaty is a message of hope for us, and for all the people of the world.

By Mr. Brown

The highest single priority in our national defense must go to the maintenance of the strategic nuclear balance. I want to say a few words about how the agreement will help us to meet that need.

The outlines of the agreement are well known. But let me repeat some of the main features.

There will be a limit on the number of strategic launchers. Each side can have 2,250. With SALT, the Soviets will have to make some reductions. Without SALT, the Soviets could, by continuing at their present rates of deployment for new systems, have a third more than this by 1985.

There will also be sublimits on the numbers of launchers for missiles with independently targetable multiple warheads. With SALT, the Soviet launchers will be limited to 820 for MIRV'ed ICBM's, the most threatening part of their force. This is fewer than we believe they planned. Without SALT, they could have many more by 1985.

Limits on New Systems

In addition, there will be limits on the introduction of new intercontinental ballistic missile systems and on the number of warheads they can carry. With SALT, the Soviets can have, for example, 10 warheads on their largest missile. Without SALT, they could have 20, perhaps even 40.

Finally, there will be a ban on interfering with national technical means of verification, and other provisions to make verification easier. We now have highly capable monitoring systems in place.

They will be bolstered by measures we are taking to replace expeditiously the capability lost in Iran. We will be able to detect any Soviet violation in ample time to protect our military security.

With SALT, we will be able to verify the agreement from the outset. Without SALT, we could be forced with concealment, countermeasures and "cheating" of all sorts, because without SALT, all of these actions would be permitted.

Even with SALT, we will need to expand our defense efforts, including specifically our efforts devoted to strategic nuclear forces. We're doing so under the program now before Congress, because SALT won't solve all of our strategic problems. However, SALT will contribute significantly to our security.

With SALT II we will be able to avoid the pressures and uncertainties of an unbounded numbers race in strategic forces. The U.S. could and would engage in such a competition if we had to. But the result would simply be more systems, more costs and greater risks with no more security, still less a situation of U.S. superiority.

SALT II will ease some of our other problems. For example, the limit on warhead numbers will make more survivable the mobile missiles whose deployment we're considering as an answer to the growing vulnerability of our Minuteman ICBM's.

SALT II will not prevent us from doing what may be needed in areas where the Soviet challenge isn't limited. For example, we will be able to work with our allies on both force modernization and arms control in response to the problems posed by the Soviet buildup of theater nuclear forces.

Large Cutbacks in Arsenals

SALT II will provide a firmer foundation for other measures to control the growth and spread of nuclear and conventional arms. It will permit continuation of the process of limiting the superpowers' strategic forces; leading, we hope, to substantial cutbacks in those arsenals.

In sum, SALT will help us maintain flexible and credible deterrence, stability and essential equivalence. Without the treaty, we would also do these things, but it would be more costly and less certain.

None of the challenges we face would be less without the treaty, and some would be greater. All the increases we plan in our defense efforts with SALT would still be needed without it, but many more would be needed as well.

I see the treaty as a valuable method of helping, along with our own moderately increased programs, to meet our nation's strategic needs. And, if the Soviet Union will emphasize cooperation rather than competition, SALT will also allow a healthier state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

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U.S.-Soviet Accords to Limit Offensive Nuclear Arms


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1972 Interim Agreement

(Heavy bombers not included)

Projected 1979 Treaty

(Would extend to the end of 1981 the 2,400 ceiling adopted in 1974)



The American-Soviet accord of 1972, which froze the number of long-range missiles of both sides at about existing levels, expired Oct. 3, 1977, but the two countries said they would abide by the provisions of the accord pending negotiation of a new treaty. The 2,400 ceiling on missiles and bombers, which under the new pact is to be in force until the end of 1981, was adopted in principle at Vladivostok in 1974 by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, and President Ford.

Highlights of the Arms Pact

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 9 — Following are highlights of the projected Soviet-American strategic arms limitation treaty:

TOTAL MISSILES AND BOMBERS

— Each side is expected to reduce the total from 2,400 to 2,250 by the end of 1981, with the reduced ceiling lasting until the treaty expires in 1985.

SUBLIMIT ON MISSILES — Each side is limited to 1,320 of the following: land-based and submarine-based launchers firing missiles armed with independently targetable multiple warheads, and bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles.

SUBLIMIT ON MIRV's — Each side is restricted to 1,200 missiles armed with a MIRV, the independently targetable re-entry vehicle. Within that total, a limit of 820 is placed on land-based launchers firing missiles armed with MIRV's. Since it is difficult to verify whether a missile actually carries a MIRV, any missile of a type that has been tested with multiple warheads will be counted as carrying a MIRV regardless of whether it does.

CRUISE MISSILES — The number of cruise missiles that may be carried on bombers is limited to an average of 28 per plane armed with such missiles. Actually no existing planes are able to

LIMIT ON WARHEADS — Each side must limit the number of warheads on an existing type of missile to the number it has already tested. This means a maximum of 10 on land-based missiles and 14 on submarine-based missiles. New missiles must abide by those limits also.

NEW MISSILE SYSTEMS — Each side is limited to the development of one "new" land-based ballistic missile system for the duration of the treaty. There is no limit on the development of new submarine-based missile systems. Existing systems may be modernized, but only within prescribed limits.

PROTOCOL — This measure, expiring at the end of 1981, bars the deployment or flight-testing of a land-based mobile missile during the period of the protocol. It also bars deployment, but not the testing, of land-based and sea-launched cruise missiles of ranges beyond 360 miles.

VERIFICATION — Each side will verify the compliance of the other by its own national technical means, meaning for example surveillance satellites, and neither side may interfere with such efforts.